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In this paper we investigate the stock market response to international monetary policy
changes in the UK and Germany. Specically, we analyse the impact of (un)expected
changes in UK and German/euro area policy rates on UK and German aggregate and
sectoral stock returns in an event study. The decomposition of the (un)expected changes
in policy rates are based on futures markets. Overall, our results suggest that, UK mon-
etary policy surprises have a signicant negative inuence on both aggregate and indus-
try level stock returns in both the UK and Germany. The inuence of German/Euro
area monetary policy shocks appears insignicant for both countries.1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed the primacy of monetary policy as the main tool used by
policymakers in the stabilisation of ination and output. Concomitantly, commentators
and analysts pay close attention to changes in policy rates in the belief that such changes,
particularly unexpected changes, can inuence stock market returns. Moreover, with in-
creasingly integrated global markets, attention is paid not only to domestic policy changes
but also to how foreign policy and foreign economic conditions can aect the domestic
economy.
Reecting these issues, greater attention has been paid to the qualitative and quantita-
tive impact of monetary policy changes on other asset prices such as interest rates, exchange
rates and stock returns. In terms of the US, examples of research that have examined
the inuence of monetary policy surprises on other interest rates include, Bomm (2003),
Kuttner (2001) and Poole and Rasche (2000). Andersen et al (2004) and Fatum and Solnik
(2003) have explored the impact of surprise changes in the US policy rate on various ex-
change rates while Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004a) and
Rigobon and Sack (2003) have all examined how US policy rate changes aect the US
stock market.
In the rst part of our study we investigate the impact of UK and German/Euro area
monetary policy changes on domestic stock returns. In particular, we examine how both
aggregate and sectoral level returns respond to domestic monetary policy changes in an
event type study. While previously mentioned research addresses this issue for the US,
there is an absence of such work for the UK and Germany.1 Hypotheses of interest include
whether aggregate stock returns respond signicantly to domestic monetary surprises? Is it
likely that all sectors in each economy react in a homogenous fashion to policy rate changes
or are there dierential eects across sectors in each economy? A recent study by Stevenson
(2002) looks at the impact of German interest rate changes on European bank stocks and
nds evidence of heterogenous response from country specic bank returns as a result of
German policy shocks.2
With increasing nancial integration, policy changes in one country are likely to impact
1Both Ganley and Salmon (1997) and Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000) investigate the output eects of UK
and German monetary policy shocks respectively at a sectoral level, using pre EMU data in a traditional
VAR setting.
2The author, however, only looks at actual interest rates.
1on stock returns in other countries. Recent work has just begun to address these issues. For
example, Andersen et al (2004) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004a) examine the inuence
of US macro variables including monetary policy on bond and foreign exchange markets
both domestically and in other countries. In the second part of our study, we examine
whether there are spillovers in terms of monetary policy changes in the German/Euro
area or the UK respectively aecting aggregate or sectoral returns in the other economy.
This raises a number of interesting questions. Do domestic and foreign monetary policy
shocks aect dierent industries in dierent countries? Are there commonalities in how
industries common to the two countries react to a domestic or foreign interest rate change?
In addition, given the potential entry of the UK into EMU, how is the UK market aected
by German/Euro area interest rates shocks.
Our results show that unanticipated changes in UK monetary policy have a signicant
impact on aggregate stock returns in both the UK and Germany. Moreover, UK monetary
policy shocks have a signicance impact on industrial returns in both the UK and Germany.
We show that the response of UK industry to UK monetary policy shocks is similar to that
observed for US industries to unanticipated changes in US monetary policy. However,
surprisingly we observe that unexpected changes in German/Euro monetary policy has
little impact on either aggregate returns or industry returns in the UK and Germany.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we rst review the related
literature and discuss the appropriate identication of monetary policy. Section 3 presents
the methodological approach adopted in this study while section 4 reports and discusses
the results and relates them to the ndings of other recent studies. Finally, Section 5
summarises our main conclusions and draws some policy implications.
2 Literature Review
A number of channels have been hypothesised regarding how monetary policy can inuence
stock market returns, see the reviews in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Sellin (2001).
For example, if markets are ecient and the value of equities are determined by the expected
discounted present value of future cash ows, a change in monetary policy can inuence
stock returns in a number of dierent ways. First, via arbitrage, a change in the monetary
authority's policy rate is likely to feed into the risk free rate and other market rates, hence,
aecting the opportunity cost of holding such an asset. This will, in turn, have an inverse
eect on the present value of future cash ows via its impact on the discount factor. Second,
2given changes in monetary policy can potentially aect output in the short to medium term,
expected future cash ows can also be inuenced by changes in economic activity induced
by such monetary policy changes.
Studies of the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices generally take one
of two approaches; vector autoregressions (VAR's) or event studies. The rationale for using
one or other approach depends on a number of considerations including the time horizon
of interest and the variables one wishes to control for and we will discuss both approaches.
2.1 Identication of Monetary Policy
There are a number of methodological issues that need to be addressed in studying the
inuence of monetary policy changes on stock market returns. These can be grouped into
three main categories 1) endogeneity, 2) omitted variable bias, 3) isolating the surprise
component of policy rate change. We will address each of these in turn.
The appropriate identication of policy changes can be most clearly seen in early studies
assessing the impact of changes in money supply on asset prices. Is the announcement of say
a change in M1 truly exogenous? Changes in this measure could equally reect changes in
money demand or money supply. A failure to properly identify monetary supply changes has
led some researchers to nd counterintuitive results.3 The issue of identication becomes
somewhat more subtle when one focuses on short term rates as the central bank's main
policy variable. In particular, a researcher wishing to isolate the inuence of a change in the
monetary authority's policy rate on asset prices needs also to be aware that causation may
run in the opposite direction, with changes in asset prices leading the monetary authority
to change policy rates. Rigobon and Sack (2003) attempt to control for this possibility.
However, they nd the impact of failing to take account of such endogeneity appears quite
small in practice. Moreover, many central bank practitioners argue that central banks have
little role in responding to asset prices per se, see for example, Vickers (1999).
Stock returns and policy rates could also change due to movements in some other
variable. In an attempt to control for the inuence of other variables, many researchers
have turned to an event study methodology. An event study attempts to control the eect
of other information that may inuence asset prices by examining a narrow time interval
surrounding the policy action or piece of news under consideration. In particular, the day of
3See, Sellin (2001) for an overview of such problems.
3the event is chosen, announcement day, and the impact on the announcement day and/or
subsequent days, event window, are analysed. Clearly, the smaller the window, the less
other factors can inuence the results and in addition the less likely there will be an issue
of endogeneity.4
Empirical work that fails to decompose monetary policy changes into its expected and
unexpected components is also likely to lead to biased results due to an errors in variables
problem. In particular, a number of theories based on the assumption of ecient markets
would suggest that only unanticipated changes in policy should inuence asset prices im-
mediately, i.e., on the announcement day of a monetary policy change asset prices should
respond only to the surprise element of such a change.
On the other hand, anticipated changes in policy should not aect asset prices on
the announcement day but instead such information should have already been priced into
the asset value by market participants when they became aware of it, i.e., prior to the
announcement day. Otherwise, arbitrage opportunities would exist and markets would be
deemed inecient. Studies that examine the inuence of policy rate changes and fail to
decompose actual changes into these two components are liable to lead to biased results.
For example, Cook and Hahn (1989) failed to take account of expected and unexpected
changes in monetary policy and so their results are subject to biases as a result of the errors
in variables problems. Other longer-term horizon studies that suer from this problem
include Concover, Mitchell and Johnson (1999) and Durham (2001).
Recent research has attempted to distinguish between surprise and anticipated changes
in monetary policy rates using one of three main approaches. These are 1) directly survey
market participants, 2) using future markets data, 3) derive expectations based on forecasts
from regression analysis. Probably the most popular method is the second approach. Its
popularity stems from the fact that in recent times futures markets have dramatically
increased both their liquidity and the range of instruments on oer. Hence, one can derive
a measure of the surprise element on a continual basis and this is the approach adopted in
this paper.
The vector autoregressive (VAR) approach has been advocated as a panacea to the
problems of endogeneity and need to isolate surprise changes in monetary policy from ac-
tual changes. In particular, an unanticipated exogenous change in the policy instrument is
identied and its eects on various asset prices can then be examined via impulse response
4See Campbell, Lo and McKinlay (1997) for a detailed discussion of the event study approach.
4functions over the short to medium term. Both Thorbecke (1997) and Patelis (1997) es-
timate VAR models for the US and nd a negative relationship between an interest rate
shock and equity returns. International cross country evidence is provided by Neri (2004)
who examines policy rate shocks while Lastrapes (1998) looks at the impact of a monetary
supply shock on stock returns for the G7. Both authors nd that a one quarter exogenous
unanticipated monetary contraction leads to a temporary decline in stock returns.
The VAR approach is, however, dependent on the data frequency used, variables in-
cluded and the ordering of the variables. Moreover, VAR studies generally use monthly
data or quarterly data and hence may lose some of the eects of interest rate changes on
asset prices due to aggregation and timing concerns. In addition, Rudebusch (1998) among
others, has questioned the nature of the shock to the policy variable generated from a VAR
on the grounds that it is somewhat articial and meaningless.
3 Methodology
Given our study is akin in methodology to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) it is useful rst
to outline their method and results in more detail. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) adopt an
event study approach when addressing the impact of US monetary policy surprises on US
stock returns. They run the following baseline regression,
Rt = 0 + 1re
t + 2ru
t + t (1)
where,
Rt is the one-day percentage change in the stock index of interest between t and t+1,
ru
t is the surprise change in the policy rate,
re
t is expected change in policy rate, i.e., the dierence between the actual change in
the policy rate and the surprise change, re
t = rt   ru
t .
An important element in the above specication is the need to derive a proxy for the
unanticipated component of the policy rate change. In the US, the policy rate target is the
federal funds rate (an interbank market rate trading excess reserves between commercial
banks) with the target rate set after each FOMC meeting. Moreover, there is a futures
5market interest rate based on the average monthly federal funds rate and this is called the
federal funds futures rate. Dierences between its value and the federal funds rate generally
reect expectations of an interest rate change. In the Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) study,
they use a scaled version of the one-day change in current month federal funds future rate
as a proxy for the unanticipated component on the day of the policy rate change.5;6
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) nd that a surprise change in US monetary policy is
statistically signicant with a negative sign, i.e., an unanticipated change in the US federal
funds rate target has a negative eect on US stock returns. On the other hand, they nd
that anticipated changes have a positive signicant inuence over the full sample.7 Similar
results have been found for the US by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Rigobon and Sack
(2004) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002) using an event study methodology.
Since we are investigating the impact of (un)anticipated changes in German/Euro area
and UK policy rates, we need measures of the surprise component in each respective policy
rate. For both the UK and German(Euro area), there are no equivalent futures market
instruments that tracks the UK or the German(Euro area) policy rate. However, there
are interest rate futures contracts that can act as close substitutes since they are likely
to be strongly inuenced by current expectations of future policy rates. Our proxy for
the unanticipated change in the German policy rate between 1989 and 1998 is the one-day
change in the 3-month Euromark futures rate. With the introduction of the euro in January
1999, we proxy surprise changes in the ECB policy rate by the one-day change in the three-
month Euribor futures rate. Bernoth and Von Hagen (2004) nd that the three-month
Euribor futures rate is an unbiased predictor of Euro area policy rate changes.8
For the UK, the policy rate is the two-week repo rate. Our proxy for the unexpected
change in the policy rate is the one-day change in the 3-month sterling futures contract.
This is one of the instruments used by the Bank of England to infer market expectations
about the likely course of monetary policy, see Brook, Cooper and Scholtes (2000).
One concern with using futures rates of a longer maturity than the policy rate, i.e.,
5Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002) nd that the fed funds future market is the best predictor of
Federal funds target rates of all interest rate instruments.
6The scaling occurs because the value of Fed fund futures contract depends on the average over the
month in question rather than at the end of the month.
7They also highlight a number of outliers and once these are accounted for the unexpected inuence
remains statistically signicant while the expected change is not statistically signicant.
8Euribor stands for Euro-Interbank Oer Rate.
6for the UK we use the three-month sterling futures contract when the policy instrument is
the two-week repo rate, is that changes in the former may reect changes that the market
anticipates in the future and not in the immediate horizon. However, Rigobon and Sack
(2004) argue that a longer maturity forward contract is more likely to catch a genuine
surprise element in the policy rate change rather than a change in timing, i.e., markets are
more likely to react to a surprise change in the policy rate relative to when markets had
factored in a policy rate change but simply got the timing wrong.9
4 Data and Empirical Results
The sample period when investigating German monetary policy shocks runs from the be-
ginning of May 1989 to the end of May 2004. In terms of UK interest rate changes we
examine the period from the start of January 1993 to the end of May 2004. The later start-
ing period for the UK was dictated by the UK leaving the ERM in early September 1992.
The Bank of England base rate is used as the policy rate. The unanticipated change in
the UK base rate is proxied by the one-day change in the price of the three-month sterling
LIBOR futures contract as traded on LIFFE.10 The data are obtained from the Bank of
England and Bloomberg respectively.
In the case of German (Euro Area) shocks, actual changes in the policy rate were
proxied by changes in the Bundesbank base rate (Lombard rate) until December 1998 and
the ECB main renancing rate for the remainder of the sample. These rates are taken
from the Deutsche Bundesbank and the ECB, respectively. The unanticipated change in
the Bundesbank base rate is proxied by the one-day change in the price of the three-month
EuroDM futures contract as traded on the LIFFE while the unanticipated change in the
ECB policy rate is proxied by the one-day change in the price of the three-month Euribor
futures contract as traded on Eurex, Frankfurt. In both cases the unanticipated change is
calculated as the one-day change on the date of the policy announcement. The data are
taken from Datastream and Bloomberg, respectively. A summary of the monetary policy
shock indicators is given in Table 1.
The stock market data comprise daily stock returns on 16 (Level 4) industry-based
9Rigobon and Sack (2003) use the three-month euro dollar rather than the one-month Fed funds futures
contract in their study of the US.
10LIFFE stands for London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange.
7portfolios for the UK and Germany, obtained from Datastream.11 The industrial sector
portfolios are selected on the basis of data availability for the two indices over the entire
sample period. The summary statistics for the full set of daily returns on each of the
sectors and the benchmark index for the UK and Germany are reported in Table 2 and 3
respectively. There is considerable variation in sector returns in each of the two countries.
4.1 Empirical Results
We rst examine the impact of domestic monetary policy shocks on domestic aggregate
and sectoral returns.
4.1.1 Inuence of UK Monetary Policy on UK Returns
In table 4, we report the impact of (un)anticipated changes in the UK policy rate on the
FTSE and UK sectoral returns by running a regression similar to equation (1).12 At an
aggregate level, the surprise element in UK policy rate changes gives rise to a negative
signicant eect on FTSE returns. In addition, anticipated changes are not statistically
signicant and hence consistent with the ecient markets hypothesis. Quantitatively, the
results imply that a surprise 25 basis point increase in the UK policy rate is associated with
roughly a 0.2 percent decline in the FTSE return. These results are qualitatively similar
to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), although they nd a greater quantitative impact on US
stock returns with respect to a surprise change in the Fed funds target rate.13
At a sectoral level, we nd similar qualitative results as those found at the aggregate
level. Nearly all sectors have a signicant negative response to a surprise change in monetary
policy while expected policy changes give rise to an insignicant response. The exceptions
to this are food processing, household, pharmacy and utilities who respond negatively but
not signicantly to a surprise change in monetary policy. Despite the use of an event study
methodology, other variables on the day of a policy change could be driving our results. For
example, if say UK stock returns respond signicantly to US stock returns, a spike in US
11All the sectors are classied as Level 4 and the portfolios are constructed by Datastream. Although the
exact constituents will dier between countries, Level 4 portfolios are broad enough to warrant meaningful
comparison across countries.
12 For all regressions, the t-statistics reported below coecient values are based on White (1980) consistent
standard errors.
13 They nd that a surprise 25 basis point increase in US rates leads to a one per cent decline in returns
on broad US stock indices.
8returns on day of the monetary announcement could bias our estimate of the response of
UK returns due to omitted variable bias. We can control for this by including any variables
which may have such an eect.
Thus, our baseline specication in equation (1) is augmented to include any other vari-
able which may aect stock returns on the day;
Rt = 0 + 1re
t + 2ru
t + yt + t (2)
where yt is any omitted variable which may potentially bias estimates of the reaction of
stock returns to monetary policy changes. Variables we have considered include, same day
aggregate stock returns of US, German, Italy and France, sterling exchange rates as well
as sectoral indices for the four above mentioned countries.14 We nd the signicance of the
coecients associated with the expected and surprise elements of a policy rate change in
table 3 are robust to the inclusion of any of these additional variables. Hence, it appears
that nearly all UK sectoral returns examined appear to respond negatively and signicantly
to a surprise in UK policy rates while expected changes do not appear to aect sectoral
stock returns.
4.1.2 Inuence of German(Euro) Area Monetary Policy on German Returns
Next we examine the inuence of German (Euro area) monetary policy on German stock
returns both at an aggregate and sectoral level with these results reported in table 5.
Neither the Dax nor the sectoral indices respond signicantly to an (un)expected change in
German (Euro Area) rates. These results are robust to the inclusion of potentially omitted
variables.15 Hence, domestic monetary policy changes do not seem to impact on German
stock returns. These results stand in stark contrast to those for the UK. A potential
explanation for the lack of impact of German monetary policy on German stock returns
is that capital markets in Germany are more long term in nature than in the UK, hence,
surprise changes in the policy rate may have only a small eect on long rates unless such
a change is viewed as persistent. In addition, Ehrmann (2000) reports evidence to suggest
14 For the US we actually used the day before return, since this is most relevant given time lag between
markets, although using a two day window does not change our results.
15Variables considered include, same day aggregate stock returns of US, UK, Italy and France, Mark
(Euro) exchange rates as well as sectoral indices for the four above mentioned countries.
9that output at an aggregate level responses more to a domestic interest rate tightening in
the UK than in the Germany.16
4.2 Spillovers of Monetary Policy on Stock Returns
In this section we explore whether there are spillovers with respect to changes in monetary
policy in one country aecting stock returns in another country. In particular, we examine
the inuence of (un)anticipated changes in UK and German/euro area monetary policy on
the respective German and UK aggregate and industry level returns. Recent studies have
highlighted the importance of economic news spillovers, in terms of their inuence on aggre-
gate stock returns, see Connolly and Wang (2003).17 Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon
(2005) nd evidence of spillovers from the US to the Euro area, but nd less evidence
of spillovers in the opposite direction. However, the literature is silent on the industrial
response to spillovers of monetary policy shocks and whether this response, if any, is ho-
mogeneous.18
4.2.1 Inuence of UK Monetary Policy on German Returns
In table 6, we report the inuence of (un)anticipated changes in the UK policy rate on same
day returns of German aggregate and sectoral returns. In terms of the DAX, we nd that
it responds negatively and signicantly to a surprise change in the UK policy rate using a
one tail test. This is in stark contrast to the lack of inuence of German(Euro) area policy
on German stock returns. In quantitative terms, the response of both the DAX and the
FTSE to an unanticipated change in UK rates is similar.
At a sectoral level, 10 out of the 16 German sectors have a negative signicant response
to a surprise change in UK rates. Once again this is at odds with the eect of German(Euro)
area monetary policy on German returns. The sectors that respond signicantly are in the
main closely aligned to those UK sectors that responded signicantly to the UK monetary
policy surprise suggesting commonalities across industries located in the two countries.
16 Ehrmann uses a structural VAR approach.
17Connolly and Wang (2003) test for economic news spillovers between the US, UK and Japan and nd
evidence of signicant spillovers, particularly from the US to Japan.
18An exception is Stevenson (2002) who looks at the impact of German interest rate changes on European
bank stocks.
104.2.2 Inuence of German(Euro Area) Policy on UK Returns
In table 7, we report the impact of (un)anticipated changes in the German (Euro area) policy
rate on both aggregate and sectoral returns in the UK. We nd that at an aggregate and
sectoral level surprise changes in German(Euro area) monetary policy have an insignicant
eect on UK returns.19 This result is robust across a number of dierent specications.
4.3 Interpretation of Results
To summarise, our results suggest that the impact of UK monetary policy on both UK
aggregate and sectoral stock returns are consistent with the predictions of theory. However,
German monetary policy shocks appear to have no inuence on German aggregate stocks
returns or industry level returns. Finally, we nd evidence of spillovers from UK policy to
both German aggregate and sectoral returns. The results suggest that industries common
to both locations, UK and Germany, react in a similar fashion to UK monetary policy shock.
How is this result interpreted, given our ndings for German monetary policy shocks?
In order to shed some light on this issue we study the impact of US monetary policy
shocks on US stock returns. In table 8, we report the response of US aggregate and
sectoral returns to (un)expected changes in US monetary policy. Comparing the sectoral
response in US relative to the UK with respect to changes in domestic monetary policy,
we nd that there is a close correspondence in terms of sectors which are signicantly
inuenced by domestic monetary policy. The exceptions are the chemical sector which
responds signicantly to changes in UK monetary policy but not in US while insurance, oil
& gas respond signicantly in the UK but not in the US. Quantitatively it does however,
appear that sectors in US respond either with a larger coecient or a more signicant
response compared to those in the UK.
The results reported here for the US are broadly consistent with the results reported in
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).20 Given the domestic industry response in the UK and US
are consistent, is it likely to be the case that US policy shocks will inuence UK and/or
German industry returns. We have examined the inuence of US monetary policy surprises
on both UK and German returns but found very little evidence that US monetary surprises
19The results here are in contrast to those reported in Stevenson (2002) for European bank returns. This
may as already highlighted be as a result of the decomposition of interest rate changes into expected and
unexpected.
20Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use the Fama-French disaggregated data in their study.
11or expected changes in rates inuenced next day UK or German returns both at either an
aggregate or sectoral level.21
5 Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the impact of UK & German/Euro area monetary policy
shocks on aggregate and industrial level stock returns. A central part of the study was the
decomposition of policy rate changes into their expected and unexpected components using
an interest rate futures contract. Our results show that UK monetary policy shocks have
a statistically signicant impact on both UK aggregate and UK industry stock returns.
This nding complements the previous literature on US monetary policy shocks and the
US results presented here. We observe that there is a similarity in the sectors which show
signicant responses. However, the UK response is of much smaller magnitude than that
observed in the US.
We also observe important spillover eects since unanticipated changes in UK monetary
policy have signicant impacts on German aggregate and industrial level stock returns.
The sensitivity to the shock is dependent on the particular industry, e.g. autoparts and
households are extremely sensitive to the shock. However, the results for German/Euro
area monetary policy shocks are dramatically dierent in relation to the importance of the
shock on both German and UK aggregate and industrial level returns. Both expected and
unexpected changes in German/Euro area monetary policy have an insignicant impact on
stock returns in Germany and the UK.
21Results not reported. Results are available from the authors on request.
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15Table 1: German/euro & UK Monetary Policy Indicators
Origin of Event Proxy for Unanticipated Target Sample
Change
German/euro 3-month euromark & Lombard rate & ECB 1989:04 -
euribor futures rate main renancing rate 2004:5
UK 3-month sterling Bank of England 1993:01 -
LIBOR futures rate repo/base rate 2004:05
16Table 2: Summary Statistics for UK Industry Returns
Mean Standard Error Minimum Maximum
FTSE 0.03 0.98 -5.36 5.10
Autoparts 0.05 1.54 -9.92 12.93
Banks 0.06 1.54 -10.15 7.33
Chemicals 0.02 1.13 -7.78 5.32
Consbuild 0.03 0.94 -4.72 5.75
Elec 0.01 1.89 -23.50 16.85
Engineering 0.02 1.13 -7.39 8.55
Foodproc 0.03 1.10 -7.21 6.10
Household 0.01 1.39 -8.93 17.79
Insurance 0.01 1.62 -13.63 9.79
Media 0.03 1.42 -6.97 9.33
Oil & Gas 0.05 1.50 -8.34 9.28
Pharmacy 0.03 1.57 -10.51 13.15
Retail 0.03 1.11 -6.71 6.24
Steel 0.01 3.86 -102.97 37.46
Transport 0.01 0.93 -7.88 4.34
Utilities 0.04 1.07 -5.32 4.75
The sectors in full are the following; auto and parts, banks, chem-
icals, construction and building materials, electricity, engineer-
ing and machinery, food production and producers, household
goods and textiles, insurance, media and entertainment, oil and
gas, pharmacy and biotechnology, retail, steel and other metals,
transport and utilities.
17Table 3: Summary Statistics for German Industry Returns
Mean Standard Error Minimum Maximum
DAX 0.03 1.17 -12.13 5.55
Autoparts 0.02 1.51 -11.84 7.49
Banks 0.02 1.41 -10.69 8.30
Chemicals 0.03 1.41 -9.46 11.81
Consbuild 0.01 1.28 -12.50 7.87
Elec 0.05 0.66 -8.38 5.01
Engineering 0.02 1.23 -16.29 7.88
Foodproc 0.04 1.11 -11.75 10.34
Household 0.03 1.27 -11.84 7.76
Insurance 0.02 1.54 -13.02 11.46
Media 0.01 1.80 -21.66 19.27
Oil & Gas 0.03 1.70 -12.30 12.79
Pharmacy 0.04 1.32 -9.78 7.72
Retail 0.02 1.48 -16.87 11.30
Steel 0.02 1.69 -14.83 14.10
Transport 0.03 1.85 -14.80 20.37
Utilities 0.04 1.22 -13.01 7.78
The sectors in full are the following; auto and parts, banks, chem-
icals, construction and building materials, electricity, engineer-
ing and machinery, food production and producers, household
goods and textiles, insurance, media and entertainment, oil and
gas, pharmacy and biotechnology, retail, steel and other metals,
transport and utilities.
18Table 4: Inuence of UK monetary policy change on UK aggregate and sectoral stock




Ftse 0.166 -0.752 0.127 0.093
(-0.879) (-1.965)
Autoparts 0.101 -1.222 0.184 0.140
(0.417) (-3.024)
Banks 0.272 -1.132 0.112 0.252
(0.875) (-1.694)
Chemicals -0.073 -0.608 0.350 0.016
(-0.973) (-5.344)
Consbuld -0.015 -0.433 0.075 0.050
(-0.142) (-2.113)
Electequip 0.161 -0.678 0.072 0.145
(0.792) (-2.234)
Engineering -0.064 -0.726 0.342 0.023
(-0.635) (-5.694)
Foodproc 0.181 -0.478 0.114 0.057
(1.336) (-1.587)
Household -0.247 0.056 0.047 0.122
(-1.444) (0.156)
Insurance 0.374 -0.723 0.215 0.082
(2.374) (-2.165)
Media 0.064 -0.898 0.137 0.107
(0.320) (-2.582)
Oil & Gas 0.133 -1.069 0.142 0.149
(0.563) (-2.071)
Pharmacy 0.435 -0.912 0.125 0.230
(1.497) (-1.531)
Retail 0.074 -0.640 0.212 0.033
(0.626) (-3.318)
Steel -0.229 -1.063 0.140 0.192
(-1.364) (-3.719)
Transport 0.085 -0.515 0.113 0.046
(0.747) (-2.163)
Utilities 0.279 -0.494 0.075 0.144
(1.410) (-0.967)
White consistent t-statistics reported below coecient values in parenthesis.
R
2 and S.E. refer to R squared and the standard error of estimate.
19Table 5: Inuence of German(Euro area) monetary policy change on German aggregate
and sectoral stock returns. Unanticipated change in policy rate proxied by 1-day change in
3-month DMibor and Euribor futures contract
Expected Surprise R
2 S.E.
Dax -0.013 0.632 0.009 0.321
(-0.065) (0.467)
Autoparts 0.052 0.922 0.033 0.193
(0.319) (0.866)
Banks 0.010 0.604 0.011 0.228
(0.062) (0.531)
Chemicals 0.098 1.097 0.027 0.393
(0.486) (0.736)
Consbuld -0.013 -0.321 0.012 0.064
(-0.219) (-0.755)
Electequip -0.162 0.164 0.019 0.385
(-0.747) (0.113)
Engineering -0.022 0.658 0.036 0.089
(-0.205) (0.910)
Foodproc 0.219 0.554 0.137 0.092
(2.683) (0.873)
Household -0.050 0.560 0.029 0.101
(-0.484) (0.856)
Insurance 0.017 0.879 0.015 0.377
(0.082) (0.616)
Media -0.336 -0.147 0.056 0.506
(-1.224) (-0.096)
Oil & Gas 0.037 -0.260 0.025 0.035
(0.610) (-0.981)
Pharmacy 0.194 1.009 0.044 0.361
(1.085) (0.736)
Retail 0.055 0.773 0.069 0.066
(0.484) (1.309)
Steel -0.057 0.665 0.044 0.091
(-0.629) (1.047)
Transport 0.011 0.620 0.007 0.396
(0.053) (0.401)
Utilities 0.212 0.893 0.066 0.241
(1.369) (0.757)
White consistent t-statistics reported below coecient values in parenthesis.
R
2 and S.E. refer to R squared and the standard error of estimate.
20Table 6: Inuence of UK monetary policy changes on German aggregate and sectoral stock




Dax 0.106 -0.794 0.098 0.126
(0.508) (-1.8300
Autoparts 0.005 -0.829 0.106 0.123
(0.023) (-1.898)
Banks 0.087 -0.783 0.116 0.100
(0.497) (-2.150)
Chemicals 0.061 -1.001 0.123 0.151
(0.250) (-2.165)
Consbuld -0.320 -0.112 0.188 0.046
(-3.621) (-0.441)
Electequip 0.024 -0.734 0.063 0.169
(0.100) (-1.872)
Engineering -0.182 -0.609 0.219 0.043
(-1.544) (-2.596)
Foodproc -0.055 -0.371 0.050 0.065
(-0.432) (-1.214)
Household -0.157 -1.010 0.228 0.086
(-0.884) (-2.917)
Insurance 0.400 -0.744 0.120 0.183
(1.828) (-1.361)
Media -0.056 -1.089 0.077 0.311
(-0.201) (-3.061)
Oil & Gas -0.404 -0.322 0.183 0.087
(-2.920) (-1.876)
Pharmacy 0.137 -0.753 0.081 0.148
(0.618) (-1.468)
Retail 0.202 -0.369 0.078 0.074
(1.603) (-1.023)
Steel 0.027 -0.321 0.025 0.084
(0.186) (-0.883)
Transport -0.094 -0.981 0.133 0.144
(-0.443) (-2.052)
Utilities 0.137 -0.794 0.137 0.090
(0.753) (-1.978)
White consistent t-statistics reported below coecient values in parenthesis.
R
2 and S.E. refer to R squared and the standard error of estimate.
21Table 7: Inuence of German(Euro Area) monetary policy changes on UK aggregate and
sectoral stock returns. Unanticipated change in policy rate proxied by 1-day change in
3-month EuroDM and Euribor futures contract
Expected Surprise R
2 S.E.
FTSE 0.276 0.744 0.068 0.321
(1.555) (0.546)
Autoparts 0.342 0.928 0.070 0.486
(1.586) (0.539)
Banks 0.642 1.572 0.128 0.843
(2.304) (0.735)
Chemicals 0.216 0.269 0.122 0.093
(2.002) (0.397)
Consbuld 0.214 0.570 0.163 0.072
(2.507) (0.968)
Electequip 0.052 -0.022 0.002 0.493
(0.237) (-0.014)
Engineering 0.284 0.338 0.153 0.123
(2.508) (0.406)
Foodproc 0.331 0.645 0.202 0.126
(3.248) (0.777)
Household 0.276 -0.677 0.227 0.086
(1.535) (-1.383)
Insurance 0.239 0.880 0.095 0.190
(1.827) (0.807)
Media 0.206 0.428 0.025 0.493
(0.963) (0.263)
Oil & Gas 0.235 0.903 0.042 0.452
(1.175) (0.572)
Pharmacy 0.378 1.437 0.073 0.639
(1.499) (0.750)
Retail 0.398 0.600 0.292 0.108
(3.697) (0.704)
Steel -0.058 0.393 0.009 0.237
(-0.462) (0.489)
Transport 0.274 0.550 0.171 0.106
(2.568) (0.659)
Utilities 0.446 0.809 0.135 0.366
(2.361) (0.586)
White consistent t-statistics reported below coecient values in parenthesis.
R
2 and S.E. refer to R squared and the standard error of estimate.
22Table 8: Inuence of US monetary policy changes on US aggregate and sectoral stock




S&P 1.714 -5.609 0.224 1.639
(2.912) (-3.059)
Autoparts 2.575 -6.879 0.121 5.855
(2.211) (-2.314)
Banks 1.490 -7.403 0.226 2.459
(1.870) (-3.999)
Chemicals 0.507 -2.094 0.020 2.934
(0.633) (-1.102)
Consbuld 0.346 -5.273 0.110 2.929
(0.450) (-2.913)
Electequip 2.633 -10.728 0.230 5.283
(2.387) (-2.641)
Engineering 1.547 -5.546 0.140 2.712
(1.812) (-2.240)
Foodproc 0.150 0.803 0.011 1.140
(0.326) (0.507)
Household 1.235 -4.494 0.088 3.001
(1.395) (-2.233)
Insurance 1.018 -1.641 0.047 1.651
(1.517) (-1.397)
Media 1.202 -4.901 0.122 2.364
(1.856) (-2.256)
Oil & Gas 0.001 0.761 0.005 1.682
(0.001) (0.425)
Pharmacy 1.111 -1.841 0.055 1.669
(1.460) (-1.337)
Retail 1.842 -9.026 0.173 5.128
(1.681) (-2.492)
Steel 0.810 -4.141 0.045 4.805
(0.711) (-1.997)
Transport 1.438 -3.893 0.047 5.250
(1.268) (-1.975)
Utilities -0.473 0.906 0.013 1.547
(-0.816) (0.548)
White consistent t-statistics reported below coecient values in parenthesis.
R
2 and S.E. refer to R squared and the standard error of estimate.
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